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The representation of miracles is central to the experience of faith for some Christians. 
For some, they believe that they have personally had such an experience. A direct encounter with 
the supernatural is the firm foundation of their faith. However, Christians do not need to have 
had this personal experience with miracles for them to be important to their faith. These 
Christians view their faith has having fundamentals that cannot be challenged. One of these 
fundamentals is that the Bible functions as a factual history. Echoing Paul in 1 Corinthians, they 
argue, “If there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been raised; and if Christ has 
not been raised, then our proclamation has been in vain and your faith has been in vain” (1 
Corinthians 15:13-14, NRSV). For the Bible to be factual, miracles must be factual as well. This 
makes it necessary for all that believe in miracles to make sense of them. 
In order to make sense of miracles, Christians have created a sensemaking institution; 
what I will call the institution of miracles. In order to protect Christianity, the institution engages 
in sensemaking. This sensemaking is conducted by self-reinforcing institutional scripts regarding 
miracles. Being able to sense-make is inherently tied to institutional membership; individuals 
that are not members will arrive at different conclusions than those on the inside. 
This institution, however, is not parallel with Christianity as a whole. It is impossible to 
speak of one Christianity, let alone one conservative Christianity. U.S. American Christianity is 
so incredibly broad and diverse that it would be unproductive to refer to it as a singular 
institution. Christianity as a global grouping has no overarching institutionalization. At least not 
outside the cosmological understanding of the Church or the body of Christ. The denominations 





splits over foundational understandings of scripture have become commonplace (Gilbert, et al., 
2019). Likewise, individual congregations, localized in a building, do not necessarily have 
discrete means of membership. Gailliard and Davis (2017) state in their research, “absent a 
formal membership process, and sometimes even with a formal process, the delineation between 
member and nonmember may be more fluid and complex and perhaps defined by other markers 
of assimilation” (p. 118). 
In order to speak productively about a conservative Christian identity, new identity 
markers need to be identified and explicated. This paper marks the institutionalized sensemaking 
of miracles as one such identity marker. While this is not a brick and mortar institution with 
positions and hierarchies, it is a set of symbolic commitments and communal interpretive 
practices that bind a group of people together. These commitments and interpretations are best 
found in the rhetorical artifacts created by the institution of miracles.  
I will be using two separate rhetorical artifacts that each illustrate different aspects of the 
institution of miracles. It’s a God Thing: When Miracles Happen to Everyday People shows how 
miracle narratives form an institutional script for sensemaking. The Case for Miracles will show 
how the sensemaking of miracles is a matter of identity creation.  
In the end, miracles will be uncovered for what they are—God’s act within those that 
believe. While attempting to maintain modernist rationalism as a way to represent miracles, the 
institution of miracles fails to produce a rationalist argument for the existence of miracles that 
concludes anything more substantive than: something happened. It remains up to sense-makers 
to make meaning out of the event. Yet, the institution of miracles must still represent the 
unrepresentable. This is the postmodern condition of the institution. This condition leaves 





miracles to represent miracles, they have to (re)present themselves as witnesses. By becoming 
witnesses, the sense-makers make the meaning of miracles by their conviction alone. In 








It’s a God Thing 
 The first rhetorical artifact I am analyzing is, It’s a God Thing. The book is a collection 
of 46 separately authored miracle stories collected by Don Jacobson and K-Love, a national 
Christian media group. This rhetorical artifact was selected because it is not much more than a 
collection of miracle stories. Aside from a list of recommendations and an introduction, the only 
rhetorical content of It’s a God Thing lies in the writing of miracle stories. In and of itself, the 
existence of such a collection serves to prove of the reality of an institution of miracles.  
As an example of one of these narratives, I will use the first story in the book to illustrate 
the general narrative found in It’s a God Thing. The story begins with Brenda Jacobson taking 
her son Blair to the United Kingdom for a study abroad program. They arrive early to enjoy the 
sights of London before Jacobson heads back to the United States. One day, the two decide to 
split up and find secluded spots in a park to read quietly. This is the setting for Jacobson’s own 
miracle. As Jacobson is sitting in the park, a man with apparent ill-intent is walking directly 
toward her with a red rope in hand. Jacobson immediately fears for her life. She is in front of 
some bushes and fears that she could easily be drug inside of them without anyone noticing. In 
response, Jacobson hears mental prompts to get up and quickly walk away from her secluded 
location. After walking a short distance, she turns to see that the man is gone. After this 
encounter she leaves the park and meets up with her son again. She enjoys the rest of her trip and 
doesn’t think much about the event in the park. Later, after arriving back in the United States, 
Jacobson is called by one of her friends that says, “Last Wednesday the Lord woke me up to pray 





“Could it be any clearer that God was protecting me?” (Jacobson, p. 5). Before the close of the 
story Jacobson ascribes the prompting thoughts to God as she states her belief in his constant 
protection and the power of prayer. 
That is just one miracle story that I’ll be referencing in this project. It’s a God Thing is 
full of many other short stories describing how God has intervened in people’s lives. Since being 
released, a second volume of It’s a God Thing has been produced with even more miracle stories 
from everyday people. Apparently, there is a demand for these miracle narratives. 
The Case for Miracles 
 New York Times bestselling author, Lee Strobel, is well known in conservative Christian 
circles. His famous first work, The Case for Christ, told the story of his journey from skeptic 
journalist to ardent believer. In the book, Strobel used his skills as a journalist to lay out the 
rational argument for belief in the biblical Christ. The Case for Christ sold millions of copies and 
was eventually made into a feature length film of the same name (About, n.d.). 
Lee Strobel’s The Case for Miracles is a continuation of the “case for” series of which 
there have been multiple previous entries. Like his other books, The Case for Miracles produces 
the pretense of journalism as Strobel writes about his interviews with, “leading authorities so 
[he] could tap into their lifetime of experience and expertise” (Strobel, p. 31). Initially, Strobel 
makes a distinction between contemporary miracle narratives and those found in the Bible. He 
claims that he is not concerned with biblical miracles, but whether God is still acting out 
miracles today (Strobel, p. 24). However, the book develops into a defense for Strobel’s 
rationalist Christianity writ large, including arguments to prove that we can trust the gospel 
accounts and Christ really died on the cross.  





perspective that we—the audience—are in situ with Strobel as he travels across the United States 
to conduct his research. In total, Strobel interviews eight individuals from various backgrounds. 
Most of the interviewees have some kind of academic credentials. At the start of their respective 
chapters their titles as Drs. or PhDs are clearly displayed. Besides those with academic 
credentials, a missionary and a former detective are also interviewed. 
I should note here the choice of style that Strobel makes in the presentation of his 
interviewees. Strobel reconstructs the interviews on the page in a way that gives him a great deal 
of control over the final rhetorical message. While it certainly makes for easy reading, Strobel 
chooses to selectively paraphrase and quote the interviewees. At times, Strobel will give us the 
thoughts he is having at a moment in an interview. In the instance of the skeptic Michael 
Shermer, Strobel even interjects counterarguments to Shermer’s statements in post. This creates 
uncertainty to the authorship of ideas that are not provided as direct quotation as indicated by 
quotation marks. What is clear is that Strobel streamlines the interviews to make the points that 
he needs it to make for his larger “case” for miracles. I say this to show that the citation of some 
ideas is tenuous as I pull from The Case from Miracles. Likewise, while this style is not 
inherently problematic, it should not be mistaken for journalism.  
Within The Case for Miracles, only one of the interviewees is expressly against the idea 
of the miraculous: Dr. Michael Shermer, editor of The Skeptic magazine. Strobel claims to 
include him in order to provide “…the best possible case against the miraculous, free from 
emotion and backed with studies and reasoned arguments” (Strobel, p. 37). Shermer is the first 
interview of the book and is the only interview under the section notably titled, “The Case 
against Miracles” (Strobel, p. 33). For the rest of The Case for Miracles, Strobel uses his other 





the book as an inoculation against the opposition. By being this external force, Shermer is the 
most important person in The Case for Miracles. His presence ultimately illuminates the 







REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Defining Miracles 
It’s a God Thing and The Case for Miracles present their own definitions for miracles; 
however, we should approach those definitions with a general understanding of miracles. I will 
briefly cover here how miracles have been defined and how their function has been explained. 
There is not singular definition for a miracle. Here, I will be focusing on just three major 
definitions: miracles as breeches of natural law, miracles as divine presence, and miracles as 
contextual.  
One of the simplest definitions of miracles is that they are violations of the laws of nature 
(Yandell, 1976, p. 392). This definition doesn’t necessarily require the intervention of a divine 
being. Other definitions explicitly include the agency of a divine being as criteria for a miracle. 
In these cases, miracles are described as the outcome of an event being changed by divine 
presence from the outcome that would have occurred if there was not divine presence (Young, 
1972, p. 123). A third definition of miracles is based in context. By this definition, events 
occurring within certain contexts are considered miraculous when in others they may be 
perfectly mundane. The defining quality of this kind of miracle is that someone holds an event to 
have religious significance (Schulz, 2017, p. 10). These definitions are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and each of these understandings of miracles make an appearance in the two rhetorical 
artifacts. If anything, this shows how difficult it is to strictly define something that is meant to be 
beyond description. 
 While these three definitions are straightforward, they can also quickly fail at defining 





what was once assumed to be natural law was actually just a suggestion. If, on the other hand, 
there are unbreakable natural laws, it is impossible for a miracle to ever transcend the 
unbreakable. In either case, a miracle, then, is just another natural event (Yandell, 1976, p. 392). 
If a miracle is a manifestation of divine presence, who can determine such a concept? This kind 
of miracle begins and ends with a person saying, “God did it” and it is up to others to either 
believe or not believe. Miracles by divine presence can never extend beyond the realm of 
unsubstantiated belief (Young, 1972, p. 126). In a similar fashion, the idea of miracles only being 
miracles within certain contexts also falls totally within the realm of human perception. This 
leads Schulz (2017) to claim that “…perceiving God is not only necessary, but also sufficient for 
perceiving a miracle…” (p. 17). Epistemically speaking, miracles exist solely within the 
individual that experienced the miracle. Even though the miracle experiencers are ascribing their 
experiences to God, the epistemic work is still entirely focused within them. In human 
invocation, God is the nameable-unnameable that cannot be produced (Derrida, 2002, p. 65). 
This naming inevitably returns to the self. 
There are also particular accounts of miracles studied within miraculous contexts. 
Higgins and Hamilton (2016) explore one such miraculous context when they interviewed 
pilgrims to the French village of Lourdes. Many of the individuals they interviewed experienced 
what Higgins and Hamilton call “mini-miracles” (p. 28). As the name implies, mini-miracles are 
less spectacular than what might typically be understood as miracles. Rather than being a breach 
in the laws of nature, mini-miracles are personally experienced transformations that are 
attributed to divine power (Higgins and Hamilton, p. 28). Much like with Schulz’s definition, the 
experience of the witness to the miracle is what truly defines a miracle. Another context for 





case, the islanders connected their own lives to the sacred narratives of their worldview 
(Papachristophorou, 2014, p. 66). In terms of miracle stories, many mothers on the island used 
narratives of experienced miracles and visions as a socially acceptable way of gaining agency. 
For example, a mother might have a vision of a saint during a rough pregnancy. This then gives 
the mother the supernatural authority to name their child after that saint rather than use a 
predetermined family name (Papachristophorou, 2014, p. 68). As the above suggests, miracle 
stories can be used in various ways to explain and direct the realities of those that witness them. 
 In each of the aforementioned cases, the making of a miracle ultimately comes down to 
the interpretation of the individuals that experience, tell, and hear about miracles. The question 
then, is not whether miracles happen or not, but what leads people to interpret events as such? 
The Institution of Miracles 
The driving force behind the interpretation of miracles is the institution of miracles. As 
an institution, the force of interpretation is sensemaking. Sensemaking makes the most sense in 
this context for a variety of reasons. The first of which is that we are not dealing with the truth 
when it comes to miracle narratives. A miracle is a product of personal experience, and nothing 
else. Sensemaking is about coming to a decision about how to understand something regardless 
of some sort of universal truth.  According to Weick et al. (2005), “Sensemaking is not about 
truth and getting it right. Instead it is about continued redrafting of an emerging story so that it 
becomes more comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed data, and is more resilient in 
the face of criticism” (p. 415). It’s a God Thing and The Case for Miracles will illustrate this 
emerging story as the institutional members are building and being built by it. 
Why bother with the abstraction of an institution when I could just as easily have 





found in sensemaking and institutional theory match well with this subject matter. Sensemaking 
analyzes what happens to people when they encounter the unusual and unexpected. Simply put, 
that is a reasonable description of what happens when someone encounters an event worthy of 
being called a miracle.  
Secondly, viewing miracle narratives as a sensemaking will bring out the most interesting 
results. Each method encourages a researcher to weigh ideas differently. The intersubjective 
nature of institutions allows us to view miracle stories as a human creation. The concept of an 
institution allows us to have a closer look at how these narratives are produced, circulated, and 
accepted. Miracles are not only experienced, but they are made (by God), told, and then heard by 
others that can then either choose to believe or not to believe.  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, institutions match better with the ontological 
nature of what these conservative Christians believe. As I argue later, the view that God holds 
dominion over the universe is an integral part to miracle sensemaking. Saying that God is in 
control of the universe is not a matter of discourse or narrative to people that believe it; it is a 
description of reality. With this ontological consideration in mind, I felt that it would be best to 
follow the same line of thinking for this project. If our goal is to understand the communication 
of others, it would be wasteful to construct our understanding in a way that disregards the way 
they understand the world. In this way, I see this project as a broad application of Warren’s 
(2008) call for more ontological research concerning difference. Each new miracle experience 
and narrative is just that: new. It is a new moment, even if it is a historically informed repetition 
(Warren, 2008, p. 297). This prevents us from viewing the world as clearly divided along our 
lines of identity. The institution of miracles certainly does not allow for such clear lines. 





Sensemaking is an analytical mindset focused on heuristics. In this case, the heuristic 
being how groups and individuals come to particular understandings of miraculous events. 
Because of this, sensemaking is concerned more with generating explanations than creating a 
body of knowledge (Weick, 1995, p. xi). Sensemaking operates on the basis that human 
experience is a constant flow. So long as what is being experienced is expected and ordinary, no 
one needs to spend time figuring out why the expected and ordinary is occurring. However, when 
the unexpected and out of the ordinary occurs, individuals will notice and begin to account for 
what was unaccounted. In those situations, individuals begin the sensemaking process. 
Sensemaking is about bringing unordinary events into the fold of the explainable. 
Experiences that are ordinary can be called such because meaning has already been created to 
account for their existence. Therefore, sensemaking is the process of creating new meanings vis-
à-vis institutional discourse. As Weick, et al. (2005) note, “Situations, organizations, and 
environments are talked into existence” (p. 409). The individuals that engage in sensemaking are 
as much creators as they are experiencers. No event is meaningful until meaning is assigned to it 
(Gabriel, 1991, p. 858). Likewise, no process of meaning creation is instantaneous. 
As Weick (1995) describes it, the process of sensemaking is intuitive. It begins with 
noticing and bracketing. The disturbance in the flow of ordinary events is noticed by an 
individual and recognized as being out of the ordinary. The event in question is then bracketed; 
or, pulled out from the flow of time as something of significance. Once the event is set apart 
from the flow of the everyday, it can be labeled. An event that is named can be remembered, 
analyzed, and shared. Presumptions can then be made about the event. The sense-maker attempts 
to connect the unknown with the know, or as Weick et al. (2005) state, “To make sense is to 





sense-maker will act upon the conclusions drawn during the sensemaking process. 
There are two important factors at work during the previously described sensemaking 
process. The first is that sensemaking occurs retrospectively. As I previously stated, sensemaking 
regards lived experience as an unstoppable flow. This means that the entire sensemaking process 
begins after the unaccounted-for event has occurred. The event can only be noticed after it has 
happened. Likewise, it can only be set aside and labelled as significant in the retrospective of the 
future. This ultimately means that individual sensemaking is oriented not toward the event itself, 
but toward the present circumstance in which the sensemaking is actually occurring. Individuals 
make sense of past problems by aligning them with present solutions. That is why sensemaking 
is about explanations not truth; consistency over actuality (Weick, 1995, p. 10). 
The second important factor is that sensemaking relies on previously established 
meanings. It is social and systemic (Weick et al, 2005, p. 412). Noticing is impossible without 
contextual knowledge. How can an individual determine something is unaccounted without prior 
knowledge of the ledgers? It is even clearer that presumption is derived from already accepted 
meanings. The consideration of local context and cues when drawing conclusions is what 
separates making presumptions from making wild guesses. Sensemaking occurs when 
predictions break down (Weick, 1995, p.5). When this occurs, sense-makers pull from already 
conceived frameworks. These frameworks come from institutions, organizational plans, and 
accepted justification and tradition (Weick et al., 2005, p. 409). It is in this way that sensemaking 
can show how macro-level entities affect individuals and vice versa (Weick, et al., p. 417). 
 Weber and Glynn (2006) define an institution as “…akin to a coherent symbolic code, 
while sensemaking is the practice of using the code” (p. 1643). These symbolic codes are made 





particular ways. The content of this kind of symbolic institution is best illustrated as a kind of 
constellation: 
We further suggest that, from a sensemaking perspective, the ‘content’ of an 
institution pertains to a constellation of identities (typified actors), frames 
(typified situations) and actions (typified expectations of performance or 
conduct). The combination of identity and frame approximates the concept of a 
situational ‘role’ (i.e. actor-in-situation), and the combination of frame and 
actions approximates the concept of a situational ‘script’ (i.e. actions-in-
situations). This conceptualization retains the sensemaking perspective’s focus on 
situational and identity-based priming of action, while opening up space for an 
institutional emphasis on typification and normative commitment. (Weber & 
Glynn, 2006, p. 1644) 
This constellation model for sensemaking institutions makes labeling each of the parts of an 
institution a quick process. 
Rather than just treating institutions as purely created by discourse or as an object, the 
understanding of institutional theory, as I use it here, attempts to balance action and structure. 
This view of institutions sees institutions as grounded in a continuous flow of discourse 
(Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004, p. 16). “This view extended the becoming approach by 
demonstrating how structure is found in action, how the historical is situated in the present, and 
how the global is firmly anchored in the local” (Fairhurst & Putnam, p. 17). At the same time, 
“…the organization never assumes the form of an identifiable entity because it is anchored at the 
level of social practices and discursive form” (Fairhurst & Putnam, p. 16). One articulation of 





draw from past experiences and organizational rationalities to make decisions in their current 
circumstances (Fairhurst & Putnam, p. 17). This mode of institutional theory is indifferent to the 
macro-micro distinction. The two are in tension, not opposition. Most importantly, this allows 
for individuals to have agency in the creation of institutions without ignoring the external forces 
at work in those individual decisions. An example of this in the institution of miracles would be 
when the individuals showcased in It’s a God Thing comes to the conclusion that they 
experienced a miracle. In order to come to that conclusion, they have to have prior knowledge of 
miracles, including what is generally considered to be the criteria of a miracle. Their 
classifications are informed by these previously existing structures but the decision to name their 
experience remains their own. 
 Considering institutions as grounded in action allows for sensemaking to play a role in 
institutional creation and maintenance. According to the constellation model created by Weber 
and Glynn (2006), “Institutions are antecedent to (as contextual mechanisms) and emergent from 
sensemaking (via transformational mechanisms)” (p. 1640). Given that institutions are 
antecedent and emergent, the focus of analysis can be on “how actors make sense with 
institutions, not outside them and despite them” (Weber & Glynn, p. 1642). As institutional 
members learn the institutional discourse, they shift their sensemaking to match with that of the 
institution. Working as an antecedent structure, institutions “constrain sensemaking by making 
some actions unimaginable and others self-evident” (Weber & Glynn, p. 1641). These self-
evident actions, with repetition, become solidified as scripts. Scripts are institutionalized, then 
self-reinforcing, so that sensemaking is less varied and stabilized. As scripts continually work, it 
becomes less likely that sense-makers within an institution can create radically different 





only serve to reify the already existing institution. Institutionalization creates a feedback loop; 
therefore, “…not only can sensemaking be the feedstock for institutionalization as others have 
suggested, but that institutions may be the feedstock for sensemaking” (Weber & Glynn, p. 
1655). 
 A closed loop of meaning creation inevitably leads to closed meaning. McWhinney 
(1984) describes a closed-meaning-making worldview as a unitary system of reality. Along with 
its counterparts in McWhinney’s paper, the unitary system has its own understanding of, 
“causality, sources of knowledge and meaning, moral judgement, will power, and influence 
processes” (McWhinney, p. 8). Members of unitary systems believe that their belief system is 
eternally true. The unitary system provides explanatory power to its believers in allowing them 
to feel that every part of the universe, including themselves, fits within the boundaries of the 
system (McWhinney, p. 13). As McWhinney states, “The fundamental criterion of reality is 
truth—whether a relationship is true, right or correct within the system of belief” (McWhinney, 
p.15). The unitary system also eliminates any need for causal explanations. Since everything 
belongs to the system, the only cause is the First Cause that created the system. As stated by 
Boyce (1995), “The unitary reality is sustained by a process of filtering out whatever is not 
recognized as truth; and, as long as a unitary believer can dismiss or deny anything that 
contradicts the truth, his/her understanding of reality is intact” (p. 132). For a believer, the world 
is empty of moral choice and doubt, because the universe is well-ordered and lacking any 
dilemma. There is no alternative to the truth. 
 Even within such a rigid system, there is still room for sensemaking. Boyce offers two 
possible ways in which sensemaking occurs in a unitary system. Firstly, Boyce suggests that 





decided to align themselves with the predetermined collective meaning, they still made the initial 
choice to do so. Afterwards, the decision to align with collective meaning is so ephemeral that 
they are not cognizant of the choice they made to join the unitary system in the first place. 
Members then experience all phenomena as bare reality (Boyce, p. 131). There is no separation 
between them and the events of the world; they are one. The second way that sensemaking can 
occur in a unitary system is by filtering new ideas through the canonized collective meaning. 
New ideas that align with the already in place system are brought in uncritically. Since it fits in 
the collective meaning, there is no need to waste active sensemaking energy on defending 








Explanation of Method 
 Sensemaking begins with chaos. Sensemaking only ends when the flux, the stream of 
undivided experiences, is organized (Weick et al., p. 411). Sensemaking is of utmost importance 
to those with a unitary view of reality because their worldview requires stability. For group 
members, the development and following of institutional scripts becomes an important part of 
identity maintenance. As Weber and Glynn (2006) note, “Making sense of ‘something out there’ 
is self-referential because what is sensed, and how it is seen, bears on the actor’s identity” (, p. 
1645). Put otherwise, identity is repetition (Warren, p. 297). I will be pinpointing these moments 
of sensemaking and identity maintenance in the rhetorical artifacts of It’s a God Thing and The 
Case for Miracles. The institutionalization of the scripts serves as the basis for the institution of 
miracles. 
Making Sense in It’s a God Thing 
It’s a God Thing is a prime example of how contemporary miracle narratives have 
become an institution. The book is indicative of the institution of miracles at two overlapping 
levels. Firstly, the existence of the book is a fact of reality. It’s a God Thing is a published work 
of collected miracle narratives. The process of collecting, selecting, and writing these stories is a 
work of institutional sensemaking. Each narrative within the book was submitted by a person 
who experienced a miracle. These people not only had to have a miraculous experience, but also 
interpret it as a miracle. Then they had to be confident enough in that interpretation to share it 
publicly to become a part of this book. The aspect of individual experience in miracle narratives 





of elements appears in many of the narratives. These repeated elements take the form of 
institutionalized scripts. At some point or another, the miracle-experiencers noted that their 
experience matched the scripts of the institution of miracles and others—such as the editors of 
the book—verified this belonging. Together, these two elements show how an institution of 
contemporary miracle narratives has been, and is continued to be made. 
The very existence of It’s a God Thing reifies the existence of miracles as a matter of 
sensemaking. The reality that these stories could be connected enough to be published in a single 
book shows a singular miracle identity has been sedimented. The collection of stories for this 
book is a work of lamination, using past knowledge—of miracle stories in this case—to define 
new miracle stories. In doing so, It’s a God Thing is now an additional artifact of the institution 
of miracles that will be added to the institutional feedstock for future sensemaking. 
Many of the miracle stories presented in It’s a God Thing have repeated elements that 
constitute institutional sensemaking. I will be labeling and analyzing them using a constellation 
of sensemaking institutions: typified actors, typified situations, typified actions, institutionalized 
roles, and institutionalized scripts (Weber & Glynn, 2006, p. 1644).  
The first of these institutional segments is institutionalized identities or typified actors. In 
terms of actors, there are a couple of actors that are always present and a few that are sometimes 
present. There is always a miracle-experiencer. This is the person or persons that becomes the 
miracle-teller as they explain in first-person what happened to them. The miracle-experiencer 
doesn’t have to be a Christian, but, in It’s a God Thing, the miracle-teller is always a Christian. 
For example, in Alison Wilson’s miracle narrative, her becoming a Christian and having a 
spiritual experience in prison is defined as a miracle (Jacobson, p. 13). While she was not a 





experiencer/teller, there would be no perspective to these miracle narratives. 
The next institutionalized identity is the miracle-doer. This is another identity that is 
present in every narrative in some way. In It’s a God Thing, the miracle-doer is always the 
Christian God. This would make all miracles within the book at least fit the definition of miracle 
as a manifestation of divine presence. While God can hardly be described as a character in these 
stories, his presence is made evident through the experience of the miracle-experiencer. The act 
of the miracle is always attributed to God as having caused it in some way. In that sense, God as 
an actor is more a force of nature than a character. 
These narratives also contain incidental actors that are not always present in every 
situation. At times, there are witnesses that verify that a miracle has occurred. One of the more 
powerful examples of this is Jacobson’s friend Sheri Rose that calls her and explains that God 
told her she was going to be murdered (Jacobson, p. 4). Rose not only verified God’s hand in the 
event, her independent knowledge of the event serves as evidence that it was truly a miracle. 
Jacobson describes her realization: 
I was stunned. We talked a little more and did the time calculations between the West 
Coast and England. It quickly became clear: God had awaken[sic] Sheri Rose at the exact 
moment I was alone in Hyde Park., lying on a secluded bench, while a man with a rope in 
his hands walked toward me. Could it be any clearer that God was protecting me? 
(Jacobson, p. 4). 
The next part of the constellation found within miracle narratives are typified situations 
or frames. The frame of miracle narratives is twofold. There is an improvement and God is 
involved. The kind of situation found in It’s a God Thing varies broadly. In some cases, the 





she is on a cruise with her husband. The narrative centers on them coping while they wait for 
means to get quickly back home. In other cases, like that of Donald L. Jacobson Sr., the situation 
is generally good. Jacobson is taking his son, Donnie, to his first professional baseball game. The 
significant similarity of these situations is that they were improved by a miracle. Heckman and 
her husband met a Christian couple on their cruise on the first night. When they receive the news 
of their daughter’s accident, the other couple is there to pray with them (Jacobson, p. 7). 
Likewise, Jacobson hopes that he could catch a baseball for his son and prays for it to happen. 
Within the moment, a ball is hit in their direction and he is able to get it. Regardless of the 
beginning situation, it was made better by the miracle. 
The two previous example narratives also illustrate the other aspect of frames found in 
It’s a God Thing. The Heckman’s meet a Christian couple that was able to offer religious 
support. Jacobson’s prayer for a baseball is immediately answered. These religious 
circumstances define the miracle narrative. Strobel, in The Case for Miracles, echoes this exact 
sentiment in one of his definitions for miracles. He states, “For me, when I see something 
extraordinary that has spiritual overtones and is validated by an independent source or event, 
that’s when the ‘miracle’ bell goes off in my mind” (Strobel, p.28). As defined above, this kind 
of frame fits the definition of miracle as contextual. The religious context made them miraculous 
rather than serendipitous. In some way, God has to be invited, or called into the situation. That 
sets the stage for the miracle. 
The primary typified action, or expectation, of these miracle narratives is straight 
forward. In each of these instances, God is the one acting. Even if it appears that someone else is 
doing the action, that is subsumed under the actions of God. For example, in an anonymous 





repeats the mantra, occasionally in doubt, that, “God will provide” (Jacobson, p. 122). In the end, 
she receives a check from a friend that will help support them financially through this time. The 
miracle-teller describes this as confirmation that God provides. While those outside the 
institution of miracles may interpret the miracle-experiencer as acting in these narratives, that is 
not a typified action of the institution. The actions of individuals are inconsequential in 
comparison to the acts of God. In some stories an individual prays for a miracle, in others God 
acts without any action preceding it. The common institutional expectation is that God acts. The 
narrativization of God as omnipresent comes to the forefront in the existence of roles and scripts.  
An institutionalized role is the actor-in-situation. In this case, there are multiple roles 
because there are multiple actors. There is, however, only one situation, the religiously-centered 
frame that improves. The first example of a role is the miracle-experiencer turned miracle-teller. 
They exist to experience the action and the change in situation in order to then share that 
experience with others. Their role is sense-maker. It is their responsibility to share their story so 
that others may experience the miracle along with them. The entirety of It’s a God Thing exists 
to propagate that role. 
The second, and most important role is that of God. God is the ever-present actor-in-
situation. In each narrative, God is called to the context by religiously framing the event. Then, 
God is held responsible for the improvement in the situation, regardless of any other minute 
action by humans. God’s role is to be ready for the greatest script: the miracle. 
The last element of the constellation is the script: the action-in-situation. God is present 
in the situation in order to act out the miracle. He is the only one that acts in situ. The other role, 
the sense-maker, only exists to describe the action of their situation. The script of all miracle 





The institutionalization of these roles and scripts is what allows members of the 
institution to sense-make together. Once institutionalized, the attributes of these stories form 
expectations for all members and direct them to certain courses of action (Weber & Glynn, p. 
1651). It is important to note that the only major definition of a miracle to not appear in the 
constellation was miracle as a breach of natural law. This absence, along with the presence of the 
other two definitions, shows the importance of experience in miracle narratives. It’s a God Thing 
is not concerned with natural law, but the presence of a God that responds to religious framing. 
The most important aspect of miracle narratives, then, is the sensemaking of the sense-maker. 
The sensemaking of miracles turns back to God, because it truly is a God thing. 
Sensemaking an Institution 
Sensemaking is the process of creating new meanings. In the end, these created meanings 
can coalesce into their own institution. As stated by Weick et al. (2005), “Situations, 
organizations, and environments are talked into existence” (p. 409). In the case of the institution 
of miracles, we are seeing an example of an institutions as grounded in a continuous flow of 
discourse (Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004, p. 16). The idea of miracle stories already exists in the 
world, it isn’t being constructed from nothing before us. That is why It’s a God Thing could be 
made in the first place: the sensemaking framework already existed. The writing and publishing 
of the book are just continuations and laminations of that already existing institution. 
With that in mind, I will show how sensemaking is taking place in It’s a God Thing by 
returning to Jacobson’s story. All of Weick’s steps of sensemaking take place in this miracle 
narrative: noticing, bracketing, labeling, presuming, and acting. By Jacobson’s account, while 
the event in the park of being approached by a person with apparent ill-intent was certainly odd, 





returned to the United States. Rose asked her what happened while she was in England, as if she 
knew something significant happened. The fact that time had passed since the miracle event 
aligns with sensemaking. Sensemaking, after all, “is about labeling and categorizing the 
streaming of experience” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 411). In other words, life is a constant flow, but 
at times we are asked—literally in this case—to extract meaning from events and label and 
explain it. This call to search for meaning caused Jacobson to search her memory and notice and 
bracket the events in the park as a significant happening. Rose stated that God had woken her up 
in the middle of the night to pray for Jacobson because she was about to be murdered. This 
labeled the event as a potential murder, a moment where things were about to take a turn for the 
worse for Jacobson. After considering the time difference, the two conclude that Jacobson was in 
the park at roughly the same time that Rose was awoken to pray. This leads them to the 
presumption that the two events were connected, and that God was acting in that moment. This 
conclusion is a presumption that turned into a re-labeling of the event as a miracle. As Weick et 
al, (2005) describes, this is a moment of connecting, “the abstract with the concrete” (p. 412). 
Knowing what they know about the concrete event—the moment in the park—they can connect 
it to the abstract concept of miracle. Finally, we can assume at some point, Jacobson decided to 
share this story as a miracle story to others. This being the final step of sensemaking: acting. 
The acting is the ultimate expression of being part of the institution of miracles. 
Returning to the last section, the final expression of miracle sensemaking can be articulated as 
God acts. The institution of miracles, through the sensemaking of God’s actions in the world, 
call members to mimic that act. Essentially, God’s role was to manifest the miracle as a script, 
the role of the miracle-experiencer is to become the miracle-teller. God is the writer of the script 





institution of miracles. It is not only a line of sensemaking, it is a sensemaking that has a radical 








The Case for Miracles and Institution Formation 
 So far, I have argued that contemporary miracle narratives constitute an institution. Now, 
I will elaborate on what kind of institution it is. I need to reiterate that this institution is not 
simply a recreation of “the Church” as it exists in the world. The institution of miracles is not 
limited to one physical church body or even to a larger denomination. This is religious 
acculturation at the institutional level (Gailliard and Davis p. 124). The institution of miracles 
cuts across different belief systems and affects the way that members see their faith in the world. 
As I claimed in the last section, membership in this institution is granted by sensemaking. The 
sensemaking is so central to the identity of these individuals that it has become a closed loop of 
meaning making—creating a unitary view of reality. To define this institutionalized unity view 
of reality, I will be using Lee Strobel’s The Case for Miracles because it is an articulation, to the 
point of polemic, for the belief in miracles. 
Fundamentalizing the Institution of Miracles 
A major element of the institution of miracles is its own reification. Strobel works to 
build and validate the existence of the institution of miracles in several ways. Strobel casts the 
institution of miracles as a fundamental force within Christianity. The first of these is by 
statistically proving that the institution has sense-makers. Secondly, Strobel shows that the 
institution of miracles has a cosmological basis in all of Christianity. If the institution of miracles 
was equivalent with the Church as institution, this connection would not be necessary. Lastly, 
Strobel indicates a more specific criteria for membership within the institution of miracles. As 





These elements, beginning as lamination, align with the concept of fundamentalism within 
contemporary Christianity. 
The first way that Strobel builds the institution of miracles is by showing that it already 
has sense-makers. Strobel does this work is by arguing that many Americans see the world 
through some form of the institution of miracles already. In the introduction of The Case for 
Miracles Strobel mentions that he commissioned a national survey to see how Americans felt 
about the idea of miracles. From a survey with 1000 people and a 55% response rate, Strobel 
claims that 2 out of 5 Americans believe they have personally experienced a miracle. Strobel 
elaborates on this statistic saying, “…which means that an eye-popping 94,729,000 Americans 
are convinced that God has performed at least one miracle for them personally” (Strobel, p. 30). 
In the end, however, this statistical argument has limited use in The Case for Miracles compared 
to the cosmological argument. 
Before his interview is finished with the skeptic, Michael Shermer, Strobel begins 
presenting the view that creation was the first miracle. The point is articulated in one of Strobel’s 
unstated points that was added after the interview. Strobel argues that if God could create the 
universe, of course he could also intervene in the world. He states, “The granddaddy of all 
miracles is the creation of the universe from nothing…In other words, if God can command an 
entire universe and even time itself to leap into existence, then walking on water would be like a 
stroll in the park and a resurrection would be as simple as a snap of the fingers” (Strobel, p. 61).  
The same argument is reiterated by the other interviewees in the book. Dr. Craig S. 
Keener, a professor at Asbury Theological Seminary, states that if God created the universe, 
certainly, he could act upon it (Strobel, p. 88). The same cosmological argument is given a 





scientist, in a chapter titled, “The Astonishing Miracle of Creation” (Strobel, p. 163). Strauss 
states, “…I’m privileged to be a scientist. I can see the nuances and subtleties and intricacies of 
nature in a way that others can’t. And invariably, they point me toward one conclusion: the God 
hypothesis has no competitors” (Strobel, p. 188). This theme of a rationalist, scientific institution 
will be continued later. Until then, we should discuss how the institution of miracles defines a 
miracle. 
Through sensemaking, institution members validate their own interpretations while 
labelling and dismissing non-members. At times, this demarcation occurs between human actors, 
at others, it is the content of sensemaking that is called into question. The first question of the 
content of sensemaking is how the institution of miracles defines a miracle. In The Case for 
Miracles, Strobel initially uses the definition of Richard L. Purtrill: “A miracle is an event that is 
brought about by the power of God that is a temporary exception to the ordinary course of nature 
for the purpose of showing that God is acting in history” (Strobel, p.49). In most cases, and in 
most arguments, however, Strobel defaults to the experiential definition that we articulated with 
It’s a God Thing. He states, “For me, when I see something extraordinary that has spiritual 
overtones and is validated by an independent source or event, that’s when the ‘miracle’ bell goes 
off in my mind” (Strobel, p.28). As an example, Strobel uses an event from his own life that he 
views as a miracle. Strobel and his wife knew that a woman in their church was struggling 
financially. In order to help her out, the Strobels wrote a check for $500 and sent it to her in the 
mail. The check would not reach her until Monday. That Sunday, in church, the women to whom 
they sent the check made a prayer request because her car was in need of repairs and she couldn’t 
afford to pay for it. The cost of the repairs would be roughly $500. While some could classify 





instance to the side of being a miracle. 
 The example of a miracle that Strobel provides falls fairly in line with the sensemaking of 
miracles found in It’s a God Thing. However, Strobel also works to explain what happens when 
all the pieces seem to be in place and a miracle doesn’t happen. During his interview, Shermer 
brought up a study of healing prayer that found that prayer made no difference in the recovery of 
sick individuals. Strobel returns to this study in his conversation with Dr. Candy Gunther Brown, 
a scientist that researches the validity of miracles. He begins the chapter by describing Shermer’s 
use of the study as a “taunt” (Strobel, p. 121). Then, once he is with Brown, Strobel asks about 
the validity of the study. Brown has two major issues with a lot of healing prayer studies. Firstly, 
they aren’t consistent in the kind of prayer used in the study. She believes that prayer with 
physical contact and other charismatic aspects work the best. Secondly, Brown discredits by 
saying that the Christians in the study, members of Silent Unity of Lee’s Summit Church, that 
Shermer cited aren’t really Christians. The members of this church have differing views on 
things such as the divinity of Christ and the meaning of sin and salvation. Strobel goes far 
enough to call them a, “classic new age cult” (Strobel, p. 129). Even if it can be reasonably 
argued that members of Silent Unity are not typical Christians, the existence of the argument 
shows the rhetoric of belonging and unbelonging of the institution of miracles. 
 The boundaries of the institution of miracles not only constrains how miracles can occur 
but also what relationship people can have with the institution. Like many institutions, it is 
important for the institution of miracles to identify which individuals are assets and who are 
potential threats. We have already seen this taking place with which kind of Christians can 
reliably do miracles in the case of the Silent Unity of Lee’s Summit Church. For Strobel, this 





believers, they would have faith in a personal God who is loving and who possesses the power 
and inclination to supernaturally intervene in people’s lives” (Strobel, p. 128). This mindset is 
characterized by the fundamentalist movement within Christianity. In order to understand some 
of the implications of being a fundamentalist institution, I will describe what fundamentalist 
Christians believe. 
Fundamentalists are defined by four central features: evangelism, inerrancy, 
premillennialism, and separatism.1 The first element, evangelism, is integral to the self-identity 
of fundamentalists. As Ammerman (1991) states, “When fundamentalists describe how they are 
different from other people, they begin with the fact that they are saved” (p. 4). While setting 
themselves apart, this also marks outsiders as targets for evangelism. One mission of 
fundamentalism is to bring the lost to salvation. The second feature of fundamentalism, 
inerrancy, focuses on how fundamentalists understand the Bible. As fundamentalists see it, if 
there is any error within the Bible the entirety of their worldview suddenly is open to uncertainty. 
This is why fundamentalists, miracle institution aside, have a unitary view of reality. Only a text 
that holds the truth of all things, from science and history to morality, can truly guarantee 
salvation. While this may appear to make the Bible the absolute authority in all things, in fact, it 
makes the group interpretations of fundamentalists the final judge of truth (Ammerman, 1991, p. 
5). The third element of fundamentalism, premillennialism, is a description of how 
fundamentalists look to the future. Taking particular scriptures form the New Testament, 
fundamentalists believe that a Rapture will come in a singular event to take all of the faithful to 
heaven (Ammerman, 1991, p. 6). For the time being, this idea adds urgency to the mission to 
evangelize non-Christians as it could come at any moment. The fourth and final element of 
 
1 This is from Marty and Appleby’s Fundamentalisms Observed. This is the most complete study of fundamentalism 





fundamentalism is separatism. Of all of the four characteristics, separatism is the most defining 
for fundamentalists. While other conservative Protestants might believe in the inerrancy of the 
Bible or the premillennial Rapture, separatism is strictly a fundamentalist trait. Separatism, in 
spite of its name, is as much about unity as it is difference. As Ammerman states, 
“Fundamentalists insist on uniformity of belief within the ranks and separation from others 
whose beliefs and lives are suspect” (p. 8). In practice, this leads fundamentalist churches to 
focus on strict adherence to doctrines. For individual fundamentalists, it often means avoiding 
people seen as other in order to maintain one’s own salvation (Ammerman, p. 8). 
  The institution of miracles is not analogous with the fundamentalist movement within 
Christianity. However, the institution of miracles is tapping into similar forces with its 
sensemaking.  It cannot be denied that the institution is concerned with the fundamentals of the 
Christian faith. Keener states as much when he argues against “…brilliant liberal scholars who 
questioned the fundamentals of the faith” (Strobel, p. 80). In the case of the institution of 
miracles, the existence of miracles would be one such fundamental element of the faith. That 
aside, there are several implications from Ammerman’s description of fundamentalism that also 
highlight attributes of the institution of miracles.  
Firstly, Christian fundamentalism began as a reaction to modernist Christianity (Marty 
and Appleby, 1992, p. 13). Strobel continues this in his interview with Dr. Roger E. Olson. 
Olson describes evangelical’s embarrassment with the supernatural as a major problem within 
the church today. He ties this embarrassment with the secularization of the church beginning 
with the theologians like Friedrich Schleiermacher (Strobel, p. 223). This is another example of 
how the institution of miracles is separate from the Church at large. Secondly, the institution of 





chastised for their disbelief. Those that deny the possibility of miracles in The Case for Miracles 
are repeatedly decried as close-minded. This is a product of the institution’s unitary view of 
reality. Third, the institution of miracles is evangelical in nature. Outsiders can always join the 
institution. All they would have to do is change their sensemaking. Regardless, even with 
unwilling subjects, the institution of miracles still lays claim to people that would deny its 
existence. The perfect example of this is the way Michael Shermer is portrayed in The Case for 
Miracles. 
The Institution of Miracles and Opposition 
 Michael Shermer, editor of the Skeptic magazine, is interviewed as, “the case against 
miracles” (Strobel, p. 33). Strobel claims that he included Shermer in the book so that the case 
for miracles could be made. In order for the case to be valid, it requires an opposing side to argue 
against. Strobel states, “After all, if it’s rational to believe in the miraculous, then that case surely 
should be able to stand up to his challenges” (Strobel, p. 32). According to Strobel, Shermer was 
chosen over other atheist commenters because he was known to not have a mocking attitude of 
religion. Reading the interview, it seems that Strobel recognizes some of Shermer’s points as 
valid, and doesn’t spend much time countering anything that he says. However, Strobel doesn’t 
counter Shermer much during his interview because he uses the other interviewees to do that in 
his stead. The most significant way that Shermer is used in The Case for Miracles, however, has 
nothing to do with his arguments. Instead, Shermer is brought into the closed sensemaking loop 
in a way that he becomes part of the unitary view of reality. 
 Strobel situates Shermer in such a way that the sensemaking of the institution of miracles 
would assimilate him; regardless of his orientation to the supernatural. This assimilation 





Christianity and miracles. Before he can be assimilated, however, Shermer has to be seen as a 
strong opponent. Strobel begins by describing Shermer as, “the most famous doubter in the 
country…” (Strobel, p. 32). Upon entering the office of Skeptic magazine, Strobel portrays it in 
contrast to a church stating, “In a sense, I was visiting the anti-church, a shrine to the science and 
reason that—in the view of many skeptics, anyway—squeeze out the legitimacy of faith in God” 
(Strobel, p. 35). Likewise, Shermer’s argument against miracles is labeled, “the knockdown 
argument” (Strobel, p. 47). All of this characterization occurs before Shermer’s interview even 
begins. 
It isn’t long after the interview begins, however, that Shermer’s role as the staunch anti-
Christian is abruptly reversed. Strobel learns that Shermer was once a Christian that had lost his 
faith. In light of Strobel’s vision of himself—a skeptic that used his skills of journalism to 
become a Christian—Shermer is his, “polar opposite: someone whose journey has taken him 
form faith to doubt, turning him from a proselytizer for Jesus into an apologist for disbelief” 
(Strobel, p. 36). The first chapter of the Shermer interview is titled “The Making of a Skeptic,” 
and begins with Shermer describing how he was a believing Christian until he gradually lost his 
faith. Although Shermer makes it clear he was slowly losing his faith as just another part of his 
life, Strobel uses his writing of the interview to ensure that the miraculous aspect of Shermer’s 
story is of utmost importance. Strobel reduces Shermer’s life experience to a trope and states, 
“The miracle that doesn’t happen can be the impetus for faith to dissipate to nothing. That’s what 
happened to Michael Shermer” (Strobel, p. 44). 
 The miracle-that-didn’t-happen occurred after Shermer finished graduate school when he 
had already all but lost his faith. His college sweetheart, Maureen, was in a terrible car accident. 





to heal her. He said, “It wasn’t like I was putting God to a test, I just felt so bad for her that I’d 
try anything” (Strobel, p. 45). When nothing happened for Maureen, he wasn’t really surprised, 
but it was the final act of the Christian part of his life. Strobel makes the point to return to 
Maureen later in the book and let us know, (if we were worried, she has kids now). The-miracle-
that-didn’t-happen is Strobel’s first move to make Shermer a pitiable character that is ignorant of 
what he has left behind. 
 At the end of Shermer’s interview, after he has delivered most of his actual arguments 
presented in this book, Strobel returns to Shermer’s spiritual life. After losing his faith because 
of a miracle and becoming an atheist, Strobel shows his audience how Shermer is still spiritual. 
Shermer describes how when he visits the cathedral in Cologne, Germany that he lights a candle 
with his wife out of respect for the universe. Strobel is surprised that this atheist could have any 
sense of spirituality and moves to asking if he is concerned about his own mortality. Shermer 
says he isn’t, and that any good god wouldn’t torture him forever for using the brain that he was 
given. Shermer’s interview ends with a description of an experience that, “sent tremors through 
Shermer’s skepticism” (Strobel, p. 68). Shermer’s wife had a broken radio that was important to 
her because she used to listen to it with her grandfather. Before they got married, Shermer had 
attempted to fix the radio to no avail. During the wedding, however, Shermer and his wife went 
into the room where the radio was and it started playing without any cause. When Strobel asked 
Shermer if he had ever sought an explanation for the event, Shermer said that the moment was 
too special to need an explanation for it. Shermer’s interview ends with him considering the 
possibility of the afterlife stating, “And if God is a part of it, I’d welcome that” (Strobel, p. 69). 
In spite being only a small section at the beginning of the book, Shermer remains a 





interviews as they attack the character that was set up as their opposition. Before talking about 
the arguments against Shermer, however, we need to talk about how counternarratives are 
created to battle the figure of Shermer. The personal stories of some of the interviewees when it 
concerns miracles were used to contrast the narrativization of Shermer. It begins immediately 
when Strobel leaves his interview with Shermer and makes his way to Kentucky to interview Dr. 
Craig Keener. In spite of his claim to desire to deliver a balanced argument free from emotion, 
Strobel’s first comment upon entering Keener’s town is to mock secular groups. He states, 
“Apparently… lawsuit happy atheists have yet to discover this hamlet of 1,638 households; its 
municipal water tower is topped with a giant white cross” (Strobel, p.74). The creation of 
opposition continues when Strobel makes it to Keener’s house. The very first direct quote from 
Keener is him stating, “I’m living proof that God doesn’t always perform miracles…I’m still 
nearsighted and suffering from male pattern baldness—which is spreading!” (Strobel, p.74). It is 
hard to believe that Strobel didn’t see how this reduces the tragedy of Shermer’s girlfriend 
Maureen to a punchline. Continuing, Keener says, much like Strobel did, that his life experience 
is the opposite of Shermer. Like Strobel, Keener was a skeptic until he used reason to eventually 
become a Christian. 
The use of conflicting life stories is a perfect example of organizational folklore being 
developed and defended. Conflicting interpretations and narrativizations lead to the taking of 
sides. As Gabriel (1991) stated, “Anyone who challenges the verity of the myth...is frequently 
cast with the forces of darkness, thus reinforcing the hold of the myth over the group” (p. 865). 
The institutional folklore of the institution of miracles not only dismisses any arguments that 
outsiders like Shermer can make, it also makes them a part of the institutional myth that they are 





pitiable atheist that lost his faith is used to laminate Shermer into an easily integrated script. 
Besides highlighting the evangelical character of the institution of miracles, this lamination 
shows how quickly sensemaking occurs in a unitary view of reality. 
The quick repetition of oppositional identities illustrates how the sensemaking of the 
institution of miracles has reached the point of a unitary view of reality. While Strobel, at least 
wrote himself, as being respectful during the interview, he spends the rest of The Case for 
Miracles quickly dismissing Shermer. Despite originally viewing Shermer as someone that 
wouldn’t mock religion, Strobel described Shermer’s tone at the start of the next chapter as, 
“…self-assured and almost cocky at times” (Strobel, p. 74). Strobel painstakingly paired many of 
his quotations from scholars with a sense-made identification. Mostly it was used to indicate 
individuals not associated with the institution of miracles. For example, there are “liberal Jesus 
scholar,” (p. 57), “atheist philosopher” (p. 65), “self-described agnostic” (p. 122), and 
“outspoken atheist,” (p. 171), to name just a few. Members of the institution can quickly identify 
from an adjective or two how the testimony of an individual is going to be used. For example, 
when outsiders are cited as agreeing with institutionalized beliefs, the citation justifies those 
beliefs because even without institutional sensemaking, they are arriving at similar conclusions. 
While identity, and the sensemaking used to get to identity are clearly important to the institution 
of miracles, they ultimately serve to discredit Shermer’s knockdown argument. The next section 
shows how the institution of miracles combats the rationality of Shermer with a rationality of 
their own creation. 
The Case for Modernist Miracles 
 Perhaps the most important element of the institution of miracles is its belief in modernist 





to a metadiscourse… making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative…” (Lyotard, 1984, 
xxiii). In The Case for Miracles, this metadiscourse is that of modernist rationality. Strobel 
believes that modernist rationality can be made part of the institution of miracles. Strobel states, 
“These days, I’m convinced that science and history—indeed reason itself—actually support the 
Christian worldview” (Strobel, p. 35). While Strobel and his interviewees attempt to assimilate 
rationality into the institution of miracles, their indecisive understanding of rationality makes this 
a failure. Throughout The Case for Miracles Strobel never settles on, or bothers to define, the 
kind of reason he is proposing for an institution of miracles. It seems that Strobel is also unsure 
about laying claim to modernism.  While he may claim that modernism is on his side, at other 
times, however, he is willing to cast science as an opposition that is resistant to the truth of 
miracles.  
 Strobel paints the instituting of miracles as a modernist entity from the beginning of The 
Case for Miracles. Much like with the lamination of Shermer into a script, Strobel uses the 
plurality of voice provided by his interviewees as a means to take hold of modernism. The first 
person to be associated with reason is Strobel himself. As previously mentioned, Strobel makes it 
clear that it was his skepticism, and rational inquiry, as a journalist ultimately made him a 
Christian (Strobel, p. 23).  Strobel illustrates that the entirety of The Case for Miracles is a 
continuation of this modernist project. At the conclusion of the book, Strobel directly references 
his first famous first work stating, “After nearly two years of research, I came to my own verdict 
about miracles: they’re often credible and convincing, and they contribute powerfully to the 
cumulative case for Christ” (Strobel, p. 265). Strobel offers himself as the first example of what 
a member of the modernist miracle institution should look like. 





miracles. In his interview, Craig Keener also sets himself up as having come to Christ as an issue 
of reason. When Keener was fifteen, he experienced the presence of God as he was dealing with 
the question of faith. He later claims that this feeling was a miracle because it was brought about 
by God’s power (Strobel, p. 81). Having originally believed that it was all foolishness, he 
decided to write out his questions about Christianity and rationally answered them one by one. 
Eventually, “…especially after he gained access to academic libraries, he emerged with a firm 
and confident faith, not just based on his personal experience with God but also grounded in 
history, science, and philosophy” (Strobel, p. 80). This reason-based faith continued afterwards 
as he came into conflict with, “…brilliant liberal scholars who questioned the fundamentals of 
the faith” (Strobel, p. 80). This leads to the first consequence of the institution of miracles being 
grounded in modernist-rationality: competing metadiscourses. For the institution of miracles, 
other Christians that are not part of the institution of miracles are just as dangerous as atheists. 
Since rationality is on the side of the institution of miracles, Keener and Strobel argue 
that their opposition is irrational. Keener states that he was able to easily refute the arguments of 
the liberal scholars. When he read their responses to his questions Keener discovered that their 
positions were weak and unbelievable. Strobel concludes from this that, “Maybe…it wasn’t 
simply about the evidence or arguments, but a predisposition against the miraculous” (Strobel, p. 
80). Keener agrees and brings up a time when he argued with a professor that was a former 
Christian. Keener said that he refuted every argument that the professor gave with evidence. 
Eventually he asks him, “If somebody were raised from the dead in front of you, would you 
believe it?” (Strobel, p. 80). The professor said no. Keener explained his frustration stating, 
“Here he was accusing me of being closed-minded because I’m a Christian, but he very clearly 





arguments and evidence” (Strobel, p. 81). The institution of miracles lays hold to the rationalist 
high ground while casting all non-members with the forces of irrationality. 
 The utilization of modernist rationality for the institution of miracles continues in other 
interviews, making it clear that the methods of modernism aren’t suitable for the work. The 
eleventh chapter of The Case for Miracles is an interview with Detective J. Warner Wallace. In 
parallel to the life trajectory of Strobel and Keener, Wallace names himself as another skeptic 
that used reason to come to Christianity. Much like Strobel, Wallace used the expertise of his 
career path to pave the way to faith. In his case, Wallace used the methods of a detective to prove 
that the gospels occurred as historical events. The first of these methods is a kind of testimony 
analysis described as follows:  
…he subjected the gospels to months of painstaking analysis through various 
investigative techniques…this skill involves critically analyzing a person’s 
account of events—including word choice and structure—to determine whether 
he is being truthful or deceptive. Eventually Wallace became convinced that 
Christianity is true beyond any reasonable doubt. (Strobel, p. 190)  
In other words, Wallace took a translated, ancient religious text and treated it like the transcript 
of a testimony from a suspect in the interrogation room. Wallace’s methods, however, are not 
limited to reading in between the lines. He also used his understanding of corpses to prove that 
Jesus factually died on the cross. An example of this is the stabbing of Jesus with a spear to 
ensure that he is dead as described in the Bible. Upon being stabbed, the Bible claims that blood 
and water came from the wound. Wallace argues that this description is proof that he was 
actually stabbed with a spear as he was dead on the cross. The water was accumulated fluid 





authors of the Bible would not be aware of this medical fact (Strobel, p. 203). After this, Wallace 
continues to detail other methods he used to prove the factuality of the Bible. Wallace is another 
sense-maker brining modernism into the fold of the institution of miracles. The chapter with 
Wallace is also a shift in The Case for Miracles as Strobel begins to shift his sensemaking of 
miracles to Christianity as a whole.  
As I noted previously, Strobel is not only concerned with proving that miracles are 
possible, but also supporting a larger epistemic interpretation of Christianity. Strobel claims, 
“These days, I’m convinced that science and history—indeed reason itself—actually support the 
Christian worldview” (p.35). In particular, we can see from this quote that Strobel isn’t talking 
about some vague concept of reason. It is a modernist for reason, which is concerned with the 
legitimacy of rational inquiry. While it can be argued that modernist rationalism is in tension 
with faith, Strobel doesn’t believe so. When Shermer describes faith as believing something 
without evidence, Strobel makes the unspoken retort that, “I was tempted to point out that 
biblical faith is taking a step in the same direction that the evidence is pointing, which actually is 
rational and logical” (Strobel, p. 55). While Strobel might be arguing about Christianity as a 
whole, this still relates directly to the institution of miracles. For Strobel his work in creating The 
Case for Miracles is important work in preserving the Church. The institution of miracles, as a 
sensemaking entity, is necessary to Strobel’s Christianity.  Strobel outlines his view that 
Christianity is concerned with modernist truth, stating 
…Christianity isn’t merely concerned with moral meaning and value; it makes 
specific factual claims about events—including miracles such as the 
resurrection—that occurred in history. If those claims aren’t actually true, the 





If, by being a claim to secular legitimacy through rationalism, the institution of miracles can prop 
up Christianity. As far as Strobel is concerned, the institution of miracles is necessary to the 
survival of the faith. While modernism may seem like the best defense for Christianity, upon 
further reflection on the institution of miracles itself, the cracks begin to show. 
 Rationality, while made into a blanket defense for Christianity, is also the best defense 
for miracles. The seventh chapter of The Case for Miracles, titled, “The Science of Miracles,” is 
an interview with Dr. Candy Gunther Brown who empirically studies miracles. As Strobel begins 
the interview, his indecision around science continues. He begins the chapter with considering 
the actual power of science to know the truth. Strobel states, “Science, of course, is not the only 
route to certainty. Believing that science is the sole arbiter of truth is called scientism, which is 
self-refuting” (Strobel, p. 122). In spite of this admonishment, Strobel also claims: 
Certainly, the use of scientific expertise can help in investigating whether claims 
of the miraculous are valid or not. Even if science cannot definitively prove God 
exists or that something supernatural has occurred, it can provide empirical 
evidence that either supports or undermines miracle accounts. (Strobel, p.123) 
After describing what he believes science can do for miracles, Strobel goes into Brown’s account 
of prayer studies. As mentioned earlier, Brown brought to Strobel’s attention how the prayer 
study Shermer referenced was conducted with people that weren’t really Christians. Here, she 
offers the value of studies of prayer on healing: 
Let’s face it: people get sick, and when they do, they often pray for healing. 
Whether scientists or medical doctors think this is a good idea or not, it’s going to 
happen. So it only makes sense to find out what occurs when there are prayers for 





they cause people to get worse? Policy makers, scientists, physicians, patients—
it’s relevant to all of them. (Strobel, p. 125) 
In order to accomplish this sort of study, medical records and tests can be compared from before 
and after the prayer has occurred. Even more so, the studies on healing prayer need to pay more 
attention to the details of prayer. Prayer is broken down and considered from several different 
areas including the idea that some people might be anointed to heal and whether or not the 
person in need of healing knows they are being prayed for. Brown concludes that prayer that 
makes physical contact and is directly asking God for healing work the best (Strobel, p. 132). 
The specificity of the requirements to be a genuine miracle doesn’t mesh with the subject of 
miracles. While Brown is convinced that there should be more study around miracles, she makes 
it clear that these studies aren’t knockdown arguments either. 
After this explanation of the scientific method applied to miracles, Brown refrains from 
claiming that this is definitive work on miracles. Brown reminds Strobel that science is much 
better at proving when something isn’t the case rather than when it is the case. In the 
implications of her own study she leaves it at “something is going on” (Strobel, p. 137). This 
conclusion, however, is good enough for Strobel. He leaves the interview with Brown stating, 
“…Brown’s work and analysis have already undermined Shermer’s claim that when research is 
conducted scientifically, it shows ‘zero’ evidence for the miraculous” (Strobel, p. 138). Strobel’s 
response begins to unravel the claim that he is concerned with the truth. Instead, Strobel’s quest 
seems to be more akin to Weick’s definition of sensemaking: 
Sensemaking is not about truth and getting it right. Instead it is about continued 
redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes more comprehensive, 





criticism. (Weick, et al, p. 415) 
Sensemaking, not modernist rationality, is the driving force of the institution of miracles. 
Strobel’s concern with rationality is not for rationality’s sake, but for institutional identity. That 
is why the institution of miracles casts all its detractors as being irrational and closed-minded. It 
is not because they are, it is because they oppose the institutional myth. Strobel, is not actually 
bending the knee to the metadiscourse that is required of to be an adherent of modernism. He is 
only trying to further laminate the idea of modern rationality into the script of the institution of 
miracles.  
This appropriation of rationalism is why Wallace conducting a testimonial analysis on the 
gospels sounds ridiculous to anyone that knows what goes into academic biblical interpretation. 
It is not interpretation, but sensemaking. The things that matter to interpreters are irrelevant. 
Wallace doesn’t need history to know differing socio-cultural contexts, he doesn’t need 
linguistics to know the nuances of Aramaic. All that Wallace needs is to align the phenomena in 
front of him with the institutionalized scripts already at his disposal. The unitary view of reality 
does the interpretive work for him while allowing institutional members to accept the 
sensemaking because it is all a repetition of previous sensemaking. Now, I will show how this 
sensemaking was used against Michael Shermer in The Case for Miracles. 
The Case Against Michael Shermer 
 The sensemaking of the institution of miracles is brought to bear on the arguments 
presented by Shermer in the opening chapters of the book. The quick sensemaking of a unitary 
view of reality ensures that Shermer’s arguments are negated through the rest of the book. These 
arguments—like the ones already shown—are unlikely to convince non-members to join the 





of reason, that does not account for the construction of institutional identity. The sensemaking of 
the institution of miracles is not an argument, but the self-reinforcing of institutional scripts. In 
order to address each of the counters to Shermer fully, I think it would be best to follow Strobel’s 
own template that, “…science and history—indeed reason itself—actually support the Christian 
worldview” (Strobel, p. 35). 
 Science is as utilized by the institution of miracles as it is disdained. The main scientific 
argument used to counter Shermer is the study of miracles by Brown. Shermer cited a miracle 
study that showed that prayer made no difference to the healing of patients and Brown 
thoroughly dismantled it. In the end, however, even Brown admits that believing something is a 
miracle will always be a matter of interpretation. She states, “And of course, everyone brings 
their own assumptions when they interpret the data, depending on where they are on the 
spectrum” (Strobel, p. 126). By the spectrum, Brown means how often people feel like miracles 
happen. On one end, some people believe that miracles happen all the time, and will see them in 
everything. On the other end, there are people that believe that miracles can absolutely never 
happen and will never see a miracle in the results. Regardless, Strobel has already defended 
against the interpretation question by leaving it at that science cannot disprove miracles (Strobel, 
p. 49). After detailing the ways that at least the effects of miracles can be proven by science, 
Strobel leaves this argument at it would be illogical to forgo the conclusion that miracles are 
impossible. 
 In terms of history, Shermer argues that the authors of the Bible were never trying to 
write a history, it was more of a myth attempting to convey non-scientific truth. In response, 
Strobel raises the question, “If the gospels didn’t intend to report actual history… then what was 





whether the gospels could be considered mythology. Keener responds: 
Certainly not, the gospel accounts are a far cry from tales in the mythological 
genre, which tend to deal with the distant past rather than more recent historical 
individuals. They addressed mythic topics, were set in primeval times, and 
featured fantastical creatures. No, mythology is a decidedly different genre than 
the gospels, no question about it. (Strobel, p. 84) 
Keener continues by stating that clearly the author of Luke was bound to the facts because the 
book opens with the words “carefully investigated” and “orderly account” (Strobel, p. 84). 
Furthermore, there were eyewitnesses to the events of the gospels. However, even if the gospels 
are not mythology, that doesn’t make them history, especially a modernist sense of history. Even 
if the individuals took care to report the truth that doesn’t mean that they did by our standards. 
Consequently, the institution of miracles has an undeveloped sense of history. What matters then, 
is not historical integrity, but the ability to use the power of the institution to call to previous 
sensemaking. 
 The matter of reason focuses on how the work of David Hume appears in The Case for 
Miracles. During the interview with Shermer, Strobel labels Shermer’s “knockdown argument” 
as his use of Hume. Shermer believes that Hume’s argument against the possibility of miracles is 
really all that is needed to not believe in miracles. The argument, as Shermer describes it, is, 
“Which is more likely, that the laws of nature be suspended or that the person telling you the 
story is mistaken or has been deceived?” (Strobel, p. 54). Strobel, not convinced by this 
argument, asks Shermer to elaborate. In brief, Shermer tells Strobel that when he was a 
Christian, he would see God acting in almost anything. He has come to realize that that was 





Christian narrative. This is precisely the same argument presented about Brown and the spectrum 
of interpretation. It seems that Shermer’s understanding really isn’t that different than the case 
presented by the institution of miracles. 
However, this middle ground is not good enough for Strobel. In response, he doesn’t 
address Hume’s argument directly; rather, he attempts to discredit him by citing scholars that 
discredit Hume’s work in general. In a section of Keener’s interview titled, “Emperor Hume Has 
No Clothes,” Strobel cites several scholars, specifically philosopher John Earman, that say that 
Hume’s arguments aren’t that good. Strobel, articulating Earman, states that the basis for Hume’s 
argument against miracles was his dislike of organized religion (Strobel, p. 91). This is also 
articulated by Keener as a matter of supernatural bias.  
 Keener uses the cosmology argument to disprove Hume. Essentially, if God made the 
universe, certainly he can interact with it. Keener illustrates this with a ballpoint pen. He states, 
“If I drop this pen, the law of gravity tells me it will fall to the floor. But if I were to reach in and 
grab the pen in midair, I wouldn’t be violating the law of gravity; I would merely be intervening” 
(Strobel, p. 88). Keener continues this reasoning to say that certainly many things that are named 
as miracles are just anomalies or coincidences. But he does remain certain that not all stories of 
miracles are false. With so many, some must be true. He believes that in some cases, a miracle is 
the best explanation for events. To deny that would, “simply def[y] reason—and ignores the 
evidence” (Strobel, p. 90). 
This defying of reason is due to what Keener and Strobel identify as “anti-supernatural 
bias” (Strobel, p. 88). Saying that miracles can’t happen because they aren’t natural is close-
minded. What Strobel and Keener are proposing, then, is the allowance of the supernatural into 





boundary between the natural and supernatural should not exist. If this is the crux of the 
argument for the institution of miracles, the question becomes, why does The Case for Miracles, 
as a modernist rational argument, exist? If believing in miracles is a matter of logical inquiry, 
why arrive at the conclusion that destroys the metadiscourse of modernism by allowing the 
supernatural world into the natural world? As mentioned earlier, the institution of miracles is not 
actually modernist, it just is coopting it as a matter of legitimacy. This is sensemaking, not 
interpretation. So, what is the modus operandi of the institution of miracles?  
Strobel is willing to admit that the subject of miracles is beyond the realm of reason, “I 
didn’t see why the faithful and the faithless couldn’t sit down and talk rationally, even about a 
topic that in its very nature transcends mere rationality” (Strobel, p.38). In order to do the 
sensemaking of the institution of miracles, and embrace institutional identity, one must accept 
the postmodern nature of the institution. Miracles are truly beyond reason; rationalism only got 
the institution of miracles to the point of something is happening. In order to make the institution 
of miracles fundamental to Christianity it is a matter of becoming an institution that straddles the 
realm of the natural and supernatural—pulling the boundary apart. 
The Case for the Postmodern Miracle Institution 
The structure of the institution of miracles is a postmodern one. The study of miracles in 
and of itself is open to this interpretation. As Schulz (2017) claimed, “…perceiving God is not 
only necessary, but also sufficient for perceiving a miracle…” (p. 17). This is in line with a 
postmodernist understanding of truth. Using Lyotard’s (1984) conception: 
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good 





the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not 
in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable. 
(p. 81) 
Taking these ideas one at a time, we begin with an institution that, “…denies itself the 
solace of good forms…” (Lyotard, p. 81). While the institution of miracles did not fully deny 
itself modernist rationality, it drops it almost immediately in Olson’s interview. In his chapter, 
Olson articulates that many Christians, even those with a fundamentalist background, aren’t 
really interested in seeing miracles happening. In part, he believes that this is because American 
Christianity has become too fond of modernist rationality. He states, “My point is that American 
evangelical Christianity has accommodated to modernity’s rationalism and naturalism… the 
truth is, they don’t really expect God to do anything except in their interior spiritual lives” 
(Strobel, p. 218). Olson concludes his argument with his belief that no Christian really wants to 
see miracles occurring. That would be frightening and upset the status quo. 
 The next element is, “…the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to share 
collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable…” (Lyotard, p. 81). Developing consensus is the 
basic function of sensemaking. As has been shown, the institution of miracles laminates scripts 
so that they can be quickly used by sense-makers. The script has been laminated into a unitary of 
view of reality so tightly, that a miracle narrative can be reduced to God acts. This script is self-
reinforced by the existence of rhetorical artifacts like It’s a God Thing. The sharing of collective 
nostalgia, however, is not limited to the creation of miracle narratives as scripts. It is also why 
The Case for Miracles became an encore of the Case for Christ by the end of the book. The 
consensus of taste is beyond just that of miracles, but a sensemaking institution that can prop up 





Lastly, “…the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to 
enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable” (Lyotard, p. 81). The 
institution of miracles, through its sensemaking, is presenting the unrepresentable nature of 
miracles. For example, the miracle narratives of It’s a God Thing return to the unitary 
understanding that God acts. There is no other way to present God acting, based off of the 
definition of a miracle, than by just believing it. It’s not something that is particularly persuasive 
to those that don’t believe. In the same sense, Strobel, Brown, and Keener concluded, the proof 
for miracles is unattainable; it cannot be presented. The use of modernism rationalism wasn’t 
enough; it would never be able to attain the miracle.  It did, however, serve as a new 
presentation. In adopting modern rationality, the institution of miracles attempted to represent 
itself in a way that rises to the dominate discourse of science. Both It’s a God Thing and The 
Case for Miracles are representations of miracles. In the first, they are self-reinforced scripts that 
laminate the telling of miracle narratives. In the second, it is the rapid sensemaking of the unitary 
reality of miracles sensemaking the world as a supernatural one. All the effort of the institution 
of miracles leads to the representation of miracles in a way that can be tangible through 
rationalist methodology. 
The postmodern institution of miracles is attempting to recreate the miraculous through 
miracle narratives and miracle polemic. The modernist rationality cautiously lifted by Strobel 
collapses into the postmodern desire of the institution of miracles. This desire to represent 
miracles supersedes any commitment to a metadiscourse of modernism. In doing so, the 







As we have seen, the miracle institution is a postmodern one. Knowing that, how does 
this postmodern sensemaking occur? This requires stepping outside of the strictly ontological to 
the level of institutional discourse. For this, I will be using Ricoeur’s discourse theory of 
performatives and his interpretation theory as it relates to testimony. Ricoeur’s definition of 
discourse is sympathetic to the definition of sensemaking I have been following so far. He states, 
“An act of discourse is not merely transitory and vanishing… It may be identified and 
reidentified as the same so that we may say it again or in other words” (Ricoeur, 1975, p 9). As 
can be seen above, the repetition of meaning is significant in sensemaking. Ricoeur’s ideas, 
particularly on the concept of testimony, will show what the representation of miracle narratives 
does. 
Ricoeur’s Interpretation Theory 
 An interpretation theory is necessary to understand any discourse due to the nature of 
human communication. The distance between communicators is massive to the point of being 
insurmountable. As Ricoeur explains, “My experience cannot directly become your experience… 
Yet, nevertheless, something passes from me to you…This something is not the experience as 
experienced, but its meaning. Here is the miracle” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 16). Ricoeur has a detailed 
interpretation theory centered around the idea of semantics. The basis of semantics is that 
discursive meaning occurs at the sentence level rather than the level of individual words. Ricoeur 
states that, “discourse is the event of language” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 9). This places discourse in a 
unique position between the dialectic of parole and langue because it engages with both. Parole 
is the act of using language while langue is the system of language. For example, the act of 
speaking with a person is parole. If you and your conversational partner can understand each 





langue of U.S. American English is being used. Between the speaking of English is the event of 
discourse. The liminal space between parole and langue allows for discourse to be a mixed 
structure of identification and predication. Together, the identifying and predicting processes 
project a world through the event of discourse. This world is a new mode of being. 
 One of the primary tools of Ricoeur’s discourse theory is his reinterpretation of speech 
act theory. Speech act theory begins with the performatives. Performatives highlight the active 
quality of language in its ability to do without leaving the plane of the utterance. The first 
performative is the locutionary act; the act of speaking itself. The second performative is the 
illocutionary act; the act directly accomplished by the speech. The third performative is the 
perlocutionary act; the effects generated by the speech act. In addition to these, Ricoeur added 
the interlocutionary act. The interlocutionary act stands between meaning and event. This 
appears in discourse as the delay between the meaning of a message being received and the event 
being acted out. For that reason, the interlocutionary act draws attention to the tension inherent in 
discourse.  
 Understanding the performatives of miracles is important because it reveals the origin of 
their meaning. Above, the script of a miracle narrative was reduced to God acts, we tell. The 
action of God is a privileged meaning of the script. It is primary to the extent that human actions 
are credited solely to God. Ricoeur uncovers the second part of this script. During the act of 
speaking a miracle story, what occurs? As I will argue, speaking miracles can only be a matter of 
testimony. 
Ricoeur on Testimony 
In his work, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, Ricoeur analyzes the role of testimony in 





kind of testimony. Ricoeur states that testimonies are a kind of report. Not all reports, however, 
are testimonies. A testimony must have a close relationship to the idea of a trial. A testimony 
makes explicit reference to the trial for which it is attesting. In the case of It’s a God Thing, there 
is no doubt that a trial is occurring. In the introduction, Jacobson directly addresses the idea of an 
opposition. He states, “You hear a lot of talk about miracles these days. Are they real? Skeptics 
will say that miracles are nothing but wishful fairy tales” (Jacobson, p. xvii). It becomes even 
clearer in The Case for Miracles that a trial is occurring. Aside from the title of the book 
indicating that a case is being made, Strobel makes it clear what the stakes of this trial are, “If 
[the factual claims of the Bible] aren’t actually true, the faith collapses and its moral authority 
evaporates” (Strobel, p. 123). These representations of miracles are not just scripts; they are 
testimony.  
The idea of testimony falls somewhat in line with the modernist arguments put forward 
by Strobel. However, in much the same way, they cannot carry the burden of proof alone. 
Testimony is quasi-empirical because it is not the perception that is being transferred but the 
report. We cannot see through the eyes of another, we can only listen to their mediated 
representation of the phenomena. Testimony takes things that are seen and transforms them into 
things said, and finally, things heard (Ricoeur, 1980, p. 4). Ricoeur describes this relationship 
saying, 
Testimony is a dual relation: there is the one who testifies and the one who hears 
the testimony. The witness has seen, but the one who receives his testimony has 
not seen but hears. It is only by hearing the testimony that he can believe or not 
believe in the reality of the facts that the witness reports. Testimony as story is 





a belief assumed by another on the faith of the testimony of the first. (Ricoeur, 
1980, p. 5) 
Just as the creation of testimony requires a witness, the interpretation of testimony requires a 
judge. Testimony has the inherent goal of judgement. Testimony works to justify an ontological 
claim that must be decided by the hearer of the testimony. This aspect of testimony means that 
the report itself cannot make meaning manifest. Testimony is an alienation of meaning, “external 
to all the arguments that the orator can invent” (Ricoeur, 1980, p. 22). The interpretive act is 
inherent to testimony, just as a judgement is needed in a trial. 
In a trial, the person giving testimony—a witness—is bound to the person that they are 
giving testimony for. Ricoeur states that the quasi-empirical nature of testimony means that a 
witness must bind themselves to the cause for which they are speaking (Ricoeur, 1980, p. 9). The 
potential to be found guilty gives more meaning to the witness’ role in the production of a 
testimony. To be bound to a testimony means that the witness is putting themselves at personal 
risk to bring meaning to the testimony. Ricoeur is quick to use this connection as a reminder that 
witness in Greek is martus; from which the word martyr is derived.  
Considering a trial being a martyr is not an argument or a proof, it is a test of conviction. 
The conviction of the witness is the beginning of meaning in a testimony. This creates a tension 
within the witness. The meaning of their testimony is produced by their inner conviction, even 
though their testimony is a perception of the external. Testimony always reaches outside of the 
witness, “In this sense, it proceeds from the Other” (Ricoeur, 1980, p. 23). In the testimony of 
miracles—if the witness is indeed a witness to the Other—they are tapping into historic signs 
and narrations of acts of deliverance (Ricoeur, 1980, p. 13). In the testimony of miracles, 





God acts. To become a convicted martus for a miracle is no minor undertaking. 
A witness does not testify about miniscule things. Witnesses attest to the radical meaning 
of the human experience, not mundane facts. The internal and external tension of testimony 
renders it as a kind of interlocutionary act. It inhabits the space between the event of what is 
witnessed and the meaning of the judgement. In the space of the interlocutionary act, the most 
significant parts of testimony occur. 
Performing Testimony 
Now that testimony has been established as an interlocutionary act, the rest of the 
performatives can be applied to the representation of miracles from the perspective of sense-
makers. The locutionary act is the telling of the miracle narrative. In speaking, they are 
conducting the speech act. However, we must remember that this process is heavily mediated. 
For example, in It’s a God Thing, it is highly unlikely that we are reading the first telling of these 
stories. Certainly, the sense-makers told the story to individuals near them in conversations. 
Then, at some point, they decided to share it so that it might be published. Even after this 
sharing, the stories went through an editor before making into the book. Along with chain of 
mediations, we must also consider the locutionary role in light of the miracle tellers as witnesses. 
If they are witnessing the act of God in the world in the form of a miracle, they cannot claim 
agency to that event. In spite of witnessing the event, the witness is alienated from it. They are 
not bonded to the cause of the event. They are however, bonded to the meaning of performative 
speech. 
 The creation of meaning is the illocutionary act of representing miracles. This is 
sensemaking. In speaking, the sense-maker is trying to laminate their institutional script on the 





no miracle necessary. The direct act of speaking is to ascribe the event to God. It is to arrive at 
the script that God acts. This is not an unintended consequence of speaking. This is necessary to 
continue the self-reinforcing of the institution of miracles. Without this continuous lamination, 
the unitary view of reality, which values stability above all else, will become unstable.  
 While the illocutionary act is to continue sensemaking, the perlocutionary act creates the 
witness. The direct action of representing miracles is to make sense of what is perceived in a way 
that aligns with the institution of miracles. Another effect of this, however, is that the sense-
maker becomes a witness. The sense-makers don’t necessarily intend to change themselves when 
they speak their miracle, but they are indeed changed. In order to testify, they have been 
convicted as a martyr. Thinking that they are reporting about the world, they are truly only 
generating meaning from themselves.  
 Here lies the interlocutionary act: The miracle is created, not by God, but by the witness. 
The miracle is the testimony of the witness, which is created within the witness as a matter of 
conviction. This is the moment of meaning creation. Before this, there is no miracle to speak of, 
only a perception still in the flow of daily life. Meaning lags behind event. The bridge between 
the two is the witness.  
 Having determined the creation of meaning in testimony, who is the judge of these 
proceedings? God is the judge. Sense-makers witness to God, about God. God is the only one 
that can truly render judgement in the matter of miracles. As seen in the institutional script, 
miracles are his acts, after all. Aside from being the source of miracles, God is the only one that 
can access the interlocutionary source of meaning. The interior process of meaning-making is 
visible to him. This ability, to know the human heart, is generally accepted among Christians, 





thoughts and intentions of the heart. And before him no creature is hidden, but all are naked and 
laid bare to the eyes of the one to whom we must render an account” (Hebrews, 4:12-13, NRSV). 
It is for God’s sake that believers are convicted. And, it is only God that can truly judge that 
conviction. Put differently, the unpresentable is presentable to God. 
If the telling of miracles is fully a God thing, and begins and ends with him, why then 
bother with modernist rationality? God requires modernism to know the hearts of believers just 
as much as witnesses need science to become convicted. The purpose of modernist epistemology 
within the institution of miracles is to create testimony not for God, but for a false judge. This 
false judge is collectively made up of individuals outside of the institution of miracles: those that 
can be proselytized. The institution of miracles believed that its self-reinforcing scripts existed 
for others, so that they would join the fold. As a result of being caught up in the meaning-making 
loop of a unitary reality the institution forgot its purpose: to tell of the acts of God, for the glory 
of God. 
There is, however, a counter-argument that outsiders should be considered a judge of 
miracles. An example of it appears prominently in the afterword of It’s a God Thing claiming 
that proselytizing is a reason for miracle narratives to exist. Jacobson states, “For any reader who 
does not have a relationship with God through Jesus, we pray that these stories have persuaded 
you of His love and His power in the lives of His children and that you will come to know and 
love Him as we do” (p. 209). While they may believe this to be the case, this cannot be true on 
two levels. Firstly, the institution of miracles is engaged in a unitary reality of sensemaking. 
They are not able to produce convincing interpretations for outsiders that are not already inclined 
to believe. Secondly, this would mean that not God, but Michael Shermer, is the judge in The 





believe this elevation of Shermer to be Strobel’s intention, nor should it be. However, it is the 
case that Strobel argued. In the use of modernist rationality, the institution of miracles forfeited 
their only true evidence: their conviction as witnesses. 
Implications 
The interlocutionary act of the witness radically changes the sensemaking of the 
institution of miracles. The creative tension of being a witness is what was missing in The Case 
for Miracles. Where modernist rationality ended, the institution of miracles was left with 
presenting the unpresentable. This presentation is possible as a matter of personal conviction in 
meaning-making. The quasi-empiricism of testimony is irrelevant. While a sense-maker may not 
be able to witness perfectly for God, Christ is the perfect witness, because he witnesses to 
himself (Ricoeur, 1980, p. 16). The call of the witness then, is to be like Christ. 
The interlocutionary act of being a witness combines with the sense-making notion of 
God acts. The sense-making of the institution of miracles was not incorrect in believing that God 
acts to create miracles. It was only oversimplified. God’s act is not to create the miracle; that 
requires the creation of meaning. God’s act is to create the witness.  
Being a witness is a matter of identity. Being born again is not far from the act of 
becoming a witness. The witness is bound to what they testify. What they testify is made by 
taking an event and making sense of it with conviction. The sense-making of the institution of 
miracles, as a unitary reality, takes advantage of this process. The stability of the unitary reality 
demands that sensemaking is a self-reinforcing of institutional norms. The needs of institutional 
sensemaking confront the only meaning-making process that can handle it: witnessing. The 
internal change of sense-makers into witnesses reflects this as the locutionary act occurs: “…you 





clearly what matters and what you had hoped to say” (Weick et al, 2005, p. 416).  
The goal of the institution of miracles then, is not to represent miracles, but to (re)present 
the inner-condition of the sense-maker as witness. This is why Strobel is fine conceding that the 
final articulated argument for miracles being that something is happening. A fundamental 
criterion of sensemaking is plausibility (Weick et al, 2005, p. 416). Strobel and his interviewees 
are less concerned with what is actual. It is not about proving that miracles do happen, but about 
proving that they can happen. This is a satisfactory conclusion, because they have separated the 
sense-making process from the process of becoming a sense-maker. Becoming a witness is to be 
radically transformed at the individual, personal level. For the institution of miracles, the 
transformation of the self has been jettisoned in favor of modernist epistemology scripted for a 
false judge. Making sense of miracles returns to the self, attempting to present the unpresentable 
to the only Judge that can perceive it. Being the witness is the miracle. This is the postmodern 








I set out to identify and explicate a new identity marker of U.S. American Christianity. 
This identity marker is the institutionalized sensemaking of miracles. While not analogous to any 
established church, denomination, or creed, the institution of miracles has its own membership 
and mission. Existing as a closed loop of sensemaking, the institution of miracles has developed 
self-reinforcing scripts for its members. Taking part in this sensemaking identifies members with 
the institution of miracles and its unitary view of reality. The sensemaking and the sense-makers 
are inseparable. In turn, identifying the sensemaking of the institution of miracles allows future 
research to focus on what the rhetoric of U.S. American Christianity is doing instead of who is 
speaking. 
Miracles exist, not as God’s act in the world, but as his act in sense-makers. Defining 
miracles requires reducing miracles to a matter of personal experience. Making this experience 
tangible leads to the creation of an institution of miracles. The institution of miracles uses 
sensemaking to arrive at scripts that can be used to create more miracle narratives. The 
sensemaking script of miracles can be reduced to God acts, we tell. That is, an ontological 
commitment that God is an active agent in the world and believers must testify to this reality. 
These miracle narratives are produced by miracle-experiencers turned miracle-tellers. Becoming 
a miracle-teller—by labeling an experience as a miracle—requires engaging in the sensemaking 
of the institution of miracles. This makes those that experience miracles sense-makers; those that 
make sense of miracles.  
 Being sense-makers, rather than interpreters, highlights how meaning is created by the 





self-reinforcing scripts of the institution. Miracles being labeled through institutional lamination 
makes sensemaking miracles a matter of identity. Those that are outside of the institution of 
miracles will not arrive at the same conclusion as those that are on the inside. 
 Not understanding how others can deny their unitary sense of reality, sense-makers of 
miracles take on the auspices of modernist rationality to produce new representations of 
miracles. People like Strobel do this work as a matter of propping up their understanding of 
Christianity. The institution of miracles is bound in Christianity as the facilitator of closed 
meaning-making. It is not Christianity as a whole, but an aspect of it that has solidified to make 
certain fundamental arguments about Christianity. The representation of these arguments using 
modernist rationality can go no further than something is happening. Despite, coming to no 
concrete scientific conclusion, Strobel concludes that those who disagree with the interpretation 
of this something are close-minded and illogical. Identifying and sensemaking with the 
institution of miracles is still necessary to conclude that miracles are real. 
 The failure to represent the unrepresentable opens the institution of miracles to its 
postmodern condition. The creation of consensus and meaning-making still rests on identity, 
rather than an external metadiscourse like modernism. Sensemaking allows for institutional 
members to make miracles tangible for those that are also part of their unitary reality. 
Sensemaking allows for the representation of miracles. This reality, for stability’s sake, must 
defend itself from any challengers to its authority, regardless of its inability to produce sense for 
non-members. This puts the institution of miracles on trial. 
 In the trial of the institution of miracles, the representation of miracles is offered as 
testimony. In becoming testimony, the sense-makers of miracles become witnesses. Being a 





making is an interlocutionary act between the event and the creation of meaning. This means that 
miracles are made, not by God, but by his witnesses. Becoming a witness, however, is the act of 
God in the world. Witnesses testify before God as judge because he is the only one that can 
rightfully judge a witness’s conviction. This is in direct contrast to the modernist rationality 
presented as evidence by the institution of miracles. The presentation of modernism, rather than 
the (re)presentation of the witness’s conviction, is a product of the institution of miracles 
privileging the process of sensemaking over the process of becoming a sense-maker.  
 The institution of miracles is about sensemaking through identity. This allows scholars to 
be able to identify this kind of sensemaking as well as to know what sensemaking can and cannot 
produce. It cannot be about making an argument to outsiders because it requires an internal 
transformation to be able to see. The final role of the institution of miracles is to be God’s 
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